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Since the publication in 1995 of the first
complete genome sequence of a free-living
organism, the bacterium Haemophilus influ-
enzae [1], more than 1,000 genomes of
species from all three domains of life—
Bacteria, Archaea, and Eukarya—have
been completed and a staggering 4,300
are in progress (not including an even
larger number of viral genome projects)
(GOLD, Genomes Online Database v.
2.0; http://www.genomesonline.org/gold.
cgi, as of August 2009). Whole-genome
shotgun sequencing remains the standard
in biomedical, biotechnological, environ-
mental, agricultural, and evolution-
ary genomics (http://genomesonline.org/
gold_statistics.htm#aname). While next-
generation sequencing technology is
changing the field, this approach will
continue to be used and lead to a
previously unimaginable number of ge-
nome sequences, providing opportunities
that could not have been thought of a few
years ago. These opportunities include
studying genomes in real-time to under-
stand the evolution of known pathogens
and predict the emergence of new infec-
tious agents (Box 1). With the introduction
of next-generation sequencing platforms,
cost has decreased dramatically, resulting
in genomics no longer being an indepen-
dent discipline, but becoming a tool
routinely used in laboratories around the
world to address scientific questions. This
global sequencing effort has been focusing
primarily on pathogenic organisms, which
today are still the subject of the majority of
genome projects [2]. Sequencing two to
five strains of the same pathogen has, in
recent years, afforded us not only a better
understanding of evolution, virulence, and
biology in general [3], but, taken to the
next level (hundreds or thousands of
strains) it will enable even more accurate
diagnostics to support epidemiological
studies, food safety improvements, public
health protection, and forensics investiga-
tions, among others.
Biodefense Funding for
Genomic Research
Since the anthrax letter attacks of 2001,
when letters containing anthrax spores
were mailed to several news media offices
and two Democratic senators in the
United States, killing five people and
infecting 17 others, funding agencies in
the US and other countries have priori-
tized research projects on organisms that
might potentially challenge our security
and economy should they be used as
biological weapons. This has resulted in
large amounts of funding dedicated to so-
called ‘‘biodefense’’ research, totaling close
to $50 billion between 2001 and 2009 [4].
Genomics has benefited greatly from this
influx of research dollars and as a result,
representatives of most major animal, plant,
and human pathogens have been sequenced
(http://www.pathogenportal.org/). Support-
ed by federal funds from the National
Institutes of Health (NIH), the National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
(NIAID), and the US Department of De-
fense, research programs, such as the Micro-
bial Sequencing Centers and the Bioinfor-
matics Resource Centers (http://www3.
niaid.nih.gov/topics/pathogenGenomics/
PDF/genomicsinitiatives.htm), have been
established that carry out genomics re-
search on pathogenic organisms and have
spearheaded a new phase of the genomics
revolution. Similar programs were started
in Europe, such as those at the Wellcome
Trust Sanger Institute in the United
Kingdom, and the multinational European
effort, The Network of Excellence Euro-
PathoGenomics (http://www.noe-epg.
uni-wuerzburg.de/epg_general.htm). As
an example of the success of these types
of programs, the genome sequences of over
90,000 influenza viruses were rapidly
generated and are now deposited in
GenBank (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
genomes/FLU/aboutdatabase.html). Be-
cause of the availability of large sequencing
capacity and the large amount of informa-
tion, the response to the 2009 H1N1
influenza pandemic was rapid and efficient
(Box 2): Genomics information was gener-
ated within days and validated diagnostic
tools were approved within weeks [5,6]. A
global response was made possible through
tremendous research efforts enabled by
genomic research.
Access to and Documentation
of Sequence Data
Open access to genomics resources (i.e.,
raw sequence data and associated publi-
cations) is an essential component of the
nation preparedness to biological threats
(biopreparedness), whether intentionally
delivered or not. Although some consider
open-source genomic resources a threat to
security [7] because they make publicly
available information that could facilitate
the construction of dangerous infectious
agents, we strongly disagree with this point
of view. Rather, we and others [8] believe
that it is an enabling tool more useful to
those in charge of our public health and
biosecurity than to those with ill inten-
tions. Genomic sequence data can provide
a starting point for the development of
new vaccines, drugs, and diagnostic tests
[9], hence improving public health capa-
bilities and increasing our bioprepared-
ness. Access to the organisms from which
the sequences are derived should be
restricted, not their genome sequences.
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broadly available, there is the potential
for commercial interests to hamper the
release of genomic data in the public
domain. Thus it is important that federally
funded large-scale genome sequencing
efforts have enforceable rapid release
policies. This accessibility could afford
further opportunities to capitalize on
investments in genome sequencing by
providing the necessary resources to bio-
preparedness.
Whereas genome projects aimed at
sequencing one, two, or three isolates of
a pathogen seemed adequate a few years
ago, it is now possible to sequence rapidly
hundreds of individual genomes for each
species. Access to relevant, well-curated
culture collections [10] and DNA prepa-
rations suitable for sequencing may be-
come a bottleneck in the future when
sequencing resources are no longer limit-
ing. More importantly, the impact of large
genomic sequence datasets from clinical
isolates will be limited without key clinical
metadata that characterize these isolates,
such as patients’ medical information,
date of isolation, and the number of
culture passages in the laboratory. Open
access to large numbers of sequences and
associated metadata allows for powerful
comparative genomic analyses and thus
provides major insights into the charac-
teristics of a pathogen. Standardized
vocabulary should be developed to de-
scribe these isolates and the genes they
contain. Such efforts have already started,
for example through the open-access
journal Standards in Genome Sciences
(SIGS) (http://standardsingenomics.org/
index.php/sigen), but the dedicated re-
sources are not adequate and highlight the
lack of understanding of the importance of
metadata in genomics. Initiatives such as
those of the Genomics Standards Consor-
tium have made great strides [11,12], but
still need widespread implementation
from the ever-expanding genomic com-
munity. Open access to the genomic DNA
that has been sequenced or the culture
from which the DNA was extracted and to
the associated metadata is key to success-
ful genome sequencing projects, whether
on single or several hundred genomes or
metagenomes. Well-documented genome
sequence data will form a key growing
resource for biodefense and other re-
search fields.
Emerging New Bioinformatics
Resources
As we enter a new era of modern
genomics, the ever-expanding sequence
datasets are becoming more challenging to
analyze.Futureanalystswillrequire powerful
new bioinformatics tools in conjunction with
new computer systems engineered with
genomic analysis in mind. Open-source
new bioinformatics software tools are being
developed that exploit Web-based services
and the increasing computing power provid-
ed by academic and commercial ‘‘cloud
computing networks’’ (large computing re-
sources provided as a service over the
Internet). For example, ‘‘Science Clouds’’
(http://workspace.globus.org/clouds/) allow
members of the scientific community to lease
cloud computing resources free of charge.
To leverage these capabilities, novel cloud-
optimized bioinformatics tools are being
developed, such as the genome sequence
read mapper CloudBurst [13]. In addition,
novel resources are currently under devel-
opment to increase the availability of open-
source bioinformatics tools for cloud com-
puting (http://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/
showAward.do?AwardNumber=0949201;
http://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward.
do?AwardNumber=0844494). These emerging
tools make access to the Worldwide Web the
only requirement to join the genomic revolution
and achieve large scale bioinformatics analyses
that could not be possible on local servers. As a
consequence, it is conceivable that in the future
genomic research will increasingly move away
from the large sequencing centers toward a
more decentralized organization. Decentralized
Author Summary
In all likelihood, it is only a matter of time before our public health system will
face a major biological threat, whether intentionally dispersed or originating from
a known or newly emerging infectious disease. It is necessary not only to increase
our reactive ‘‘biodefense,’’ but also to be proactive and increase our
preparedness. To achieve this goal, it is essential that the scientific and public
health communities fully embrace the genomic revolution, and that novel
bioinformatic and computing tools necessary to make great strides in our
understanding of these novel and emerging threats be developed. Genomics has
graduated from a specialized field of science to a research tool that soon will be
routine in research laboratories and clinical settings. Because the technology is
becoming more affordable, genomics can and should be used proactively to
build our preparedness and responsiveness to biological threats. All pieces,
including major continued funding, advances in next-generation sequencing
technologies, bioinformatics infrastructures, and open access to data and
metadata, are being set in place for genomics to play a central role in our public
health system.
Box 1. Hot Spots for the Emergence of Infectious Disease
Can we define ‘‘hot spots’’ of microbial populations where new infectious
diseases are more likely to evolve? Human contact with new types of infectious
agents precedes the emergence of infectious diseases. Infectious agents can be
new in the sense of not having previously infected humans or new in the sense
that a combination of preexisting genetic factors (for example, mobile elements
or regulatory elements) have reassembled to give rise to an infectious agent with
a substantially altered genome. The Ebola virus, which first emerged by infecting
humans 1976 in Zaire [21], is an example of the former, whereas the acquisition of
antimicrobial resistance by Acinetobacter baumannii [22] is an example of the
latter. In both cases, a change in the selective pressure on an infectious agent
allows its emergence from a specific setting. This selective pressure may be, for
example, the new niche that the human host provides to the pathogen or the
antimicrobial selection on a pathogen. Since both events rely on preexisting
genetic resources and not on the de novo evolution of virulence factors, the
potential of a setting to serve as a hot spot or reservoir for an emerging infectious
disease is theoretically predictable from the examination of the total metagen-
ome. In this scenario, traditional microbiological approaches that focus on single
isolates of bacteria or viruses are limited in their predictive power since they lack a
view of the complete genetic landscape. The potential infectious disease agent
could, however, arise from an environment that only contains pieces of a
‘‘virulence puzzle,’’ i.e., individual virulence factors encoded within the genomes
of different organisms (the metagenomic ‘‘gene soup’’). These pieces would have
to be assembled in one species for the new pathogen to emerge as an infectious
agent.
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analysis of infectious agents will enable near-real-
time global surveillance, detection of new
pathogens, new virulence factors, antimi-
crobial resistance determinants, or engineered
organisms.
Population Genomics Applied
to Single Cultures
Because the resources for affordable
high-throughput sequencing, data pro-
cessing, and analysis are available, the
time is right to think about microbial
population genomics and large-scale mi-
crobial metagenomics in the context of
biodefense research (Box 3). Traditional-
ly, the concept of population genomics
has applied to variation within a species.
However, a bacterial culture, even if
derived from a single clone, is composed
of millions of cells that are not necessarily
identical at the genome sequence level,
hence forming a population of genomes.
Therefore we propose to apply the
concept of population genomics to mi-
crobial cultures. The assemblage of
genotypes defines what is called a ‘‘cul-
ture,’’ ‘‘culture stock,’’ or ‘‘reference
strain.’’ Population genomics addresses
the genomic diversity within these assem-
blages and has significant implications for
many fields of research but, most impor-
tantly, for pathogen evolution, diagnos-
tics, epidemiology, and microbial foren-
sics. For example, following the anthrax
mail attacks of 2001, microbiologists and
genomicists joined forces to characterize
the unique genetic traits of the Bacillus
anthracis spores recovered from the enve-
lopes, which were quickly identified as
the B. anthracis Ames strain (DAAR et al.,
unpublished data). Sequencing the ge-
nome of several single colonies obtained
from the spores revealed that the entire
chromosome and its associated plasmids
were 100% identical to the genome
sequence of the ancestral B. anthracis
Ames strain that was stored for over 20
years in a military laboratory in Freder-
ick, Maryland. The only genotypic dif-
ferences were found in a small, pheno-
typically and genetically distinct portion
of cells grown from the spores used in the
attacks. Genomic characterization of
these phenotypic variants revealed a
number of unique genetic alterations that
together provided a characteristic DNA
fingerprint of the spore population that
could be unequivocally matched to the
spore sample used in the attacks. Using
this fingerprint, a genetic assay was
developed to screen a B. anthracis spore
repository, which identified the origin of
the spores as a single spore stock of B.
anthracis Ames. This stock was stored at
the US Army Medical Research Institute
for Infectious Diseases in Fort Detrick,
Maryland, narrowing the pool of suspects
to a manageable number (those who had
access to the spore stock) for the investi-
gative team. The police investigation that
followed identified a potential suspect as
the custodian of the spore stock. This was
the first use of microbial genomics as an
essential tool in a forensic investigation.
In the course of the investigation, scien-
tists had to establish culture repositories
f r o ms t r a i n su s e di nr e s e a r c hi nt h eU S
and build databases of genome sequences
of all B. anthracis isolates. This work took
several years and delayed the investiga-
tion significantly. A lesson to be learned
from this investigation should therefore
be that there is a need for comprehensive
databases of unique DNA fingerprints of
stocks of potentially threatening patho-
gens. In the event that another bioterror
attack were to take place such genomic
databases would be key in quickly
establishing the source of the biological
material.
The concept of populationgenomics also
applies to epidemiological studies of out-
breaks of infectious diseases such as those
caused by food-borne or zoonotic patho-
gens, such as Salmonella spp. Traditionally,
epidemiologists and pathologists have used
low-resolution methods such as pulsed-field
gel electrophoresis (PFGE), multi-locus
sequence typing (MLST), or multi-locus
variable number tandem repeats analysis
(MLVA) to trace an individual isolate from
a patient back to a potentially infected food
source or to isolates from other patients
[14–17]. In 2006, for example, during an
outbreak of pathogenic Escherichia coli
O157:H7 infections in 26 states of the
US, which was caused by contaminated
spinach, isolates of the pathogen were
recovered from cows and wild pigs (the
zoonotic reservoirs), bags of spinach (the
vehicle of transmission), and ill patients
(http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/mm55d926a1.htm). One
of these isolates was designated as the
reference for the outbreak based on
conserved PFGE patterns. Genome
sequencing of several isolates from the
same outbreak performed in our labo-
ratory, however, revealed genomic
variations that questioned a direct
evolutionary link between all out-
break-associated isolates (Eppinger
et al., unpublished data). Comparative
genomics followed by whole-genome
phylogenetic analyses based on single
nucleotide polymorphisms demonstrat-
ed that these isolates were indeed
closely related to one another and only
distantly related to other E. coli
O157:H7 isolates, hence linking all
isolates to the same outbreak, some-
thing that was not possible using PFGE
patterns. In this case, phylogenetic
analyses suggest that several highly
related genotypes were at the source
of the outbreak, thus challenging the
Box 2. Pandemic H1N1 2009 Influenza: A Recent Example of the
Impact of Genomics on Biopreparedness
Genomics can be readily applied to follow outbreaks of infectious diseases. This is
clearly illustrated during the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak
in 2002–2003 and the emergence and worldwide spread of the pandemic H1N1
2009 influenza virus this year. In both cases, genomics played a key role in the
immediate response to the outbreak. Initially, very little was known about the
virus responsible for the SARS outbreak. Pangenomic virus microarrays identified
it as a coronavirus [23]; however, it was only through detailed sequencing that the
specific genotype of this virus could be determined [24]. Comparative sequence
analysis identified the SARS virus as distinct from other coronaviruses in terms of
its encoded proteins responsible for antigen presentation. This finding ultimately
lead to development of diagnostics [25] and potential therapeutics [26]. This
example of a sequencing approach as a rapid response to a virus outbreak
demonstrates that genomics can be a useful and important, if not essential,
epidemiological tool. In the ongoing H1N1 influenza outbreak, the National
Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) established the Influenza Virus
Resource (a database and tool for flu sequence analysis, annotation, and
submission to GenBank; http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genomes/FLU/SwineFlu.
html), containing 462 complete viral genome sequences from worldwide viral
samples (as of September, 2009). Some of the genomic data was completed,
compared, and released to the public within two weeks of isolation of the DNA.
The rapid generation of genome sequence data is providing a paradigm shift in
the analysis of infectious disease outbreaks, from more classical methods of
isolation to the rapid molecular examination of the pathogen in question.
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strain to a specific outbreak. Instead,
collecting and sequencing tens or
hundreds of isolates from each source
or patient linked to an outbreak would
provide a better basis for understand-
ing the genomic diversity within the
outbreak population and would aid in
defining the population dynamics of an
outbreak.
A New Concept: Contrabiotics
Insufficient attention has been paid to
the human microbiome (i.e., the consor-
tium of microbes that inhabit the human
body) as it relates to our efforts to
increase biopreparedness. New analyses
of the diversity and composition of the
human microbiome are making it in-
creasingly clear that human health
depends on a delicate equilibrium be-
tween the microbial inhabitants and the
human host [18,19]. Severe effects on
health could be caused not only by the
introduction of true pathogens in the
traditional sense into these human-asso-
ciated microbial communities (e.g., Vib-
rio cholerae, the etiologic agent of cholera)
but potentially also by slight shifts in the
proportions of different populations wi-
thin the community that give an other-
wise harmless species or strain an un-
desirable advantage over others, a sim-
ilar situation to what is observed in
bacterial vaginosis [20]. Probiotic die-
tary supplements of live microorganisms
deliver beneficial bacteria that promote
an healthy state of the targeted micro-
biota. In a completely hypothetical
possibility, the opposite would also be
plausible, where the healthy microbiota
(skin, gut, or upper respiratory tract,
among others) may be disturbed by
introducing large amounts of ‘‘contra-
biotics,’’ i.e., living nonpathogenic bac-
teria that would shift the microbiota
away from a healthy state. A better
understanding of the ecological princi-
ples that shape the composition of our
microbiome might contribute to our
biopreparedness for such a threat to
public health.
Challenges for the Future
The field of biodefense has thoroughly
embraced genomics and made it a
keystone for developing better identifica-
tion technologies, diagnostic tools, and
vaccines and improving our understand-
ing of pathogen virulence and evolution.
Enabling technologies and bioinfor-
matics tools have shifted genomics from
a separate research discipline to a tool so
powerful that it can provide novel
insights that were not imaginable a few
years ago, including for example redefin-
ing the notion of strains or cultures in the
context of biopreparedness or microbial
forensics. Challenges remain, though,
mostly in the form of large amounts of
data that are being generated, and will
continue to be generated in the future,
and are becoming difficult to manage.
The need for better bioinformatic algo-
rithms, access to faster computing capa-
bilities, larger or novel and more efficient
data storage devices, and better training
in genomics are all in critical demand,
a n dw i l lb er e q u i r e dt of u l l ye m b r a c et h e
genomic revolution. Our nation’s pre-
paredness for biological threats, whether
they are deliberate or not, and our public
health system would benefit greatly by
leveraging these capabilities into better
real-time diagnostics (in the environment
as well as at the bedside), vaccines, a
greater understanding of the evolution-
ary process that makes a friendly microbe
become a pathogen (Box 3) (hence to
better predict what microbial foes will be
facing us in the near future), and better
forensics and epidemiological tools. The
time is right to be bold and capitalize on
these enabling technological advances to
sequence microbial species or complex
microbial communities to the greatest
level possible—that is, hundreds of ge-
nomes per species or samples—but let us
n o tf o r g e tt h a ti n f o r m a t i c sa n dc o m p u t -
ing resources are now becoming the
bottleneck to actually making major
progress in this field.
References
1. Fleischmann RD, Adams MD, White O,
Clayton RA, Kirkness EF, et al. (1995) Whole-
genome random sequencing and assembly of
Haemophilus influenzae Rd. Science 269:
496–512.
2. Guzman E, Romeu A, Garcia-Vallve S (2008)
Completely sequenced genomes of pathogenic
bacteria: A review. Enferm Infecc Microbiol Clin
26: 88–98.
3. Binnewies TT, Motro Y, Hallin PF, Lund O,
Dunn D, et al. (2006) Ten years of bacterial
genome sequencing: Comparative-genomics-
based discoveries. Funct Integr Genomics 6:
165–185.
4. Franco C (2008) Billions for biodefense: Federal
agency biodefense funding, FY2008-FY2009.
Biosecur Bioterror 6: 131–146.
5. Rowe T, Abernathy RA, Hu-Primmer J,
Thompson WW, Lu X, et al. (1999) Detection
of antibody to avian influenza A (H5N1)
virus in human serum by using a combina-
tion of serologic assays. J Clin Microbiol 37:
937–943.
6. Maurer-Stroh S, Ma J, Lee RT, Sirota FL,
Eisenhaber F (2009) Mapping the sequence
mutations of the 2009 H1N1 influenza A virus
neuraminidase relative to drug and antibody
binding sites. Biol Direct 4: 18.
7. Aldhous P (2001) Biologists urged to address risk
of data aiding bioweapon design. Nature 414:
237–238.
8. Read TD, Parkhill J (2002) Restricting genome
data won’t stop bioterrorism. Nature 417: 379.
9. Bambini S, Rappuoli R (2009) The use of
genomics in microbial vaccine development.
Drug Discov Today 14: 252–260.
10. Tindall BJ, Garrity GM (2008) Proposals to clarify
how type strains are deposited and made available to
thescientificcommunityforthepurposeofsystematic
research. Int J Syst Evol Microbiol 58: 1987–1990.
11. Garrity GM, Field D, Kyrpides N, Hirschman L,
Sansone SA, et al. (2008) Toward a standards-
Box 3. Simple Genomics, Population Genomics, and
Metagenomics
It is now technically possible and scientifically desirable to combine sequencing
projects on single genomes, genome populations, and metagenomes to study
genome evolution. Single-genome projects provide the greatest resolution for
identifying genetic factors responsible for specific virulence phenotypes and
provide answers to many important questions, such as: What is the minimal gene
set in a pathogen required to cause a specific disease phenotype? What does the
genetic context of virulence or antibiotic resistance factors tell us about their
evolutionary origin or the mobility between different microbial species or even
genera? Population-level genome sequencing projects provide us with informa-
tion about the pangenomic gene pool and the potential of a species to evolve
into a novel pathogen. Are certain bacterial species or strains more likely than
others to evolve pathogenic traits? What distinguishes a commensal from a
pathogenic isolate? What provides the trigger or ability to convert a commensal
or opportunistic strain into a pathogen? What role does horizontal gene transfer
play in species evolution? Is an infection always caused by an individual isolate or
might infection be caused by a combination of individuals in a population that all
have different attenuated infectious potentials? Metagenomics projects sample
the genetic reservoir (the set of genes carried by all members of a community)
within a specific environment or sample. This ‘‘gene soup’’ reflects the maximum
genetic potential accessible to individual isolates by horizontal gene transfer.
PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org 4 October 2009 | Volume 7 | Issue 10 | e1000217compliant genomic and metagenomic publication
record. OMICS 12: 157–160.
12. Field D, Garrity GM, Sansone SA, Sterk P,
Gray T, et al. (2008) Meeting report: The fifth
Genomic Standards Consortium (GSC) work-
shop. OMICS 12: 109–113.
13. Schatz MC (2009) CloudBurst: Highly sensitive
read mapping with MapReduce. Bioinformatics
25: 1363–1369.
14. Gerner-Smidt P, Hise K, Kincaid J, Hunter S,
Rolando S, et al. (2006) PulseNet USA: A five-
year update. Foodborne Pathog Dis 3: 9–19.
15. Urwin R, Maiden MC (2003) Multi-locus se-
quence typing: A tool for global epidemiology.
Trends Microbiol 11: 479–487.
16. Keim P, Price LB, Klevytska AM, Smith KL,
Schupp JM, et al. (2000) Multiple-locus variable-
number tandem repeat analysis reveals genetic
relationships within Bacillus anthracis. J Bacteriol
182: 2928–2936.
17. Boxrud D, Pederson-Gulrud K, Wotton J,
Medus C, Lyszkowicz E, et al. (2007) Compar-
ison of multiple-locus variable-number tandem
repeat analysis, pulsed-field gel electrophoresis,
and phage typing for subtype analysis of Salmonella
enterica serotype Enteritidis. J Clin Microbiol 45:
536–543.
18. Gao Z, Tseng CH, Strober BE, Pei Z, Blaser MJ
(2008) Substantial alterations of the cutaneous
bacterial biota in psoriatic lesions. PLoS One 3:
e2719.
19. Turnbaugh PJ, Ley RE, Mahowald MA,
Magrini V, Mardis ER, et al. (2006) An obesity-
associated gut microbiome with increased capac-
ity for energy harvest. Nature 444: 1027–1031.
20. Srinivasan S, Fredricks DN (2008) The human
vaginal bacterial biota and bacterial vaginosis.
Interdiscip Perspect Infect Dis 2008: 750479.
21. Pourrut X, Kumulungui B, Wittmann T,
Moussavou G, Delicat A, et al. (2005) The
natural history of Ebola virus in Africa. Microbes
Infect 7: 1005–1014.
22. Peleg AY, Seifert H, Paterson DL (2008)
Acinetobacter baumannii: Emergence of a successful
pathogen. Clin Microbiol Rev 21: 538–582.
23. Wang D, Urisman A, Liu YT, Springer M,
Ksiazek TG, et al. (2003) Viral discovery and
sequence recovery using DNA microarrays. PLoS
Biol 1: e2. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0000002.
24. Marra MA, Jones SJ, Astell CR, Holt RA,
Brooks-Wilson A, et al. (2003) The genome
sequence of the SARS-associated coronavirus.
Science 300: 1399–1404.
25. Zhu M (2004) SARS immunity and vaccination.
Cell Mol Immunol 1: 193–198.
26. Haagmans BL, Osterhaus AD (2006) Coronavi-
ruses and their therapy. Antiviral Res 71:
397–403.
PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org 5 October 2009 | Volume 7 | Issue 10 | e1000217